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Abstract 
 
In recent years, judgement aggregation has emerged as an important area of 
social choice theory. Judgement aggregation is concerned with aggregating 
sets of individual judgements over logically connected propositions into a 
set of collective judgements. It has been shown that even seemingly weak 
conditions on the aggregation function make it impossible to find functions 
that produce rational collective judgements from all possible rational 
individual judgements. This implies that the step from individual 
judgements to collective judgements requires trade-offs between different 
desiderata, such as universal domain, rationality, epistemological quality, 
and unbiasedness. These dilemmas challenge us to decide which conditions 
we should relax. The typical application for judgement aggregation is the 
problem of group decision making. Juries and expert committees are the 
stock examples. However, the relevance of judgement aggregation goes 
beyond these cases. In this survey I review some core results in the field of 
judgement aggregation and social epistemology and discuss their 
implications for the analysis of distributed thinking. 
 Introduction 
Thinking is often taken as an activity exercised by individuals. In recent years, however, it 
has been acknowledged that thinking can also be a collective process. It is not only 
individuals who process information, take stances, and make decisions—groups can do 
this, too. For instance, a court jury needs to gather information, reach collective stances on 
the information available, and make a decision on the sentence. The same is true for 
cabinets, expert panels, shipping crews, air-traffic controllers, appointment committees, et 
cetera. Individuals can differ in their ability to process information rationally and reach 
correct decisions. Similarly, groups can differ in their success to arrive at correct decisions, 
and they may arrive at these decisions in a rational or in an irrational way. In this sense 
groups are engaged in collective thinking.  
It is difficult to observe how individuals process complex information and arrive at a 
decision. For groups, however, this process is more transparent. Psychologists and social 
scientists can observe how groups deliberate, how they form judgements, and how they 
finally reach decisions. These collective decision processes can be compared and 
evaluated. Some processes are obviously epistemically poor and irrational: For instance, a 
court jury should not throw a coin to decide whether a defendant is guilty; an expert panel 
should (arguably) not randomly select one expert to make all decisions, a cabinet should 
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not always choose the course of action with the least support, etc. But it is more difficult to 
determine good collective decision procedures, and we will see that it is often impossible 
to determine collective decision procedures that meet some seemingly harmless desiderata.  
Different strands of literature have discussed the nature of distributed thinking. One 
strand, inspired by the psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1962, 1978), analyses distributed 
thinking in relation to distributed cognition. In recent years, this research paradigm was 
advanced by Edwin Hutchins (1995) and his influential study of “cognition in the wild”. 
Research on distributed cognition was also influenced by Andy Clark’s and David 
Chalmers’ concept of the “extended mind” (Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 1997). This 
approach emphasizes that the boundaries between mind and world are often difficult to 
draw, and that organisms reshape their environment to solve the problems they encounter. 
The mind is a “leaky organ”, as Clark (1997, p. 53) puts it, “mingling shamelessly with 
body and with world”.  
Another strand of literature that tackles the phenomenon of distributed thinking draws 
on concepts from social choice theory and social epistemology. Goldman (2004) and List 
(2005, forthcominga) have pointed out that there are at least two dimensions on which a 
group’s performance as a thinking system can be measured. First, the group can succeed or 
fail to be rational, where rationality is understood as avoiding logical contradictions in the 
judgements the group makes. Second, the group can be more or less successful in reaching 
correct decisions, given the information available. The first dimension poses a “rationality” 
or “coherence” challenge, the second a “knowledge” or “correspondence” challenge to the 
group. The rationality challenge can be explored with tools provided by social choice 
theory, the knowledge challenge with generalizations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem and 
the information pooling literature.  
Social choice theory systematically investigates the processes to aggregate individual 
information into collective information. The classical problem for social choice theory is 
the aggregation of preferences. The famous Arrow Theorem shows that there is no 
aggregation procedure to map the individual preferences to collective preferences that 
meets some seemingly harmless and arguably normatively desirable conditions (Arrow, 
1963). While the aggregation of preferences is of great importance for welfare economics, 
it is not quite the right framework to address distributed thinking. However, recently the 
social choice framework has been extended to the more general question of judgement 
aggregation. Judgement aggregation investigates different procedures to aggregate 
individual judgements to collective judgements. Again, impossibility results arise, posing 
challenges for distributed thinking.  
Related to the field of judgement aggregation are considerations regarding the epistemic 
quality of different aggregation procedures. The discussion starts with Condorcet’s famous 
observation that large groups tend to make correct dichotomous choices. But Condorcet’s 
ideas can be extended to other choice situations as well. If information is distributed 
between agents, and these agents need to arrive at a joint decision based on the 
information, then one can ask which procedures are best suited to aggregate this 
information to maximize the probability of a correct decision.  
Returning to the two strands of literature mentioned above, it appears that the 
distributed cognition approach on the one hand, and the social choice and epistemology 
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approach on the other, talk past each other. So far, the exchange between the two 
approaches has been limited. This paper does not attempt a reconcilliation or propose a 
new synthesis. The rather more modest goal is to introduce some basic ideas from the field 
of judgement aggregation and considers the upshot for distributed thinking. The paper is in 
4 sections. I start by explaining the problem posed by the “discursive dilemma” and how it 
pertains to distributed thinking. Section 2 generalizes by approaching problems of 
judgement aggregation more formally. In section 3 I analyze the epistemic performance of 
different judgement aggregation procedures. I discuss the relation between rationality, 
consistency, and distributed thinking in section 4. At this point, I will return to the relation 
between distributed cognition and social choice theory, and discuss how these two 
approaches may relate. More specifically, I will argue that judgement aggregation provides 
a framework for the analysis of distributed thinking, despite charges that it is too 
reductionist to be of interest. 
 
 1 The Discursive Dilemma 
A central problem that has triggered much work in the field of judgement aggregation is 
the so-called “doctrinal paradox” (Kornhauser and Sager, 1986) or, more generally, the 
“discursive dilemma” (List and Pettit, 2002). I start by describing two examples that 
illustrate the problem.  
Consider three MI5 officers who have to evaluate whether an observed suspect is 
planning to build a bomb. There are three officers, and they assess the situations by 
forming judgements on correctness of three propositions:  
 The suspect has bought fertilizer (P).  
 If the suspect has bought fertilizer, it follows that the subject plans to assemble a 
bomb ( P Q ) .1  
 The suspect plans to assemble a bomb (Q). 
These propositions are logically connected. For instance, if an officer believes that the 
subject has bought fertilizer, and if she also believes that if the subject has bought fertilizer 
then the subject is building a bomb, then the officer must also hold that the subject plans to 
build a bomb. If she does not, the officer’s judgements would be inconsistent.  
We assume that all officers (individually) hold consistent sets of beliefs, i. e. they do not 
contradict themselves, and that they make judgements on all propositions at stake. One 
possible constellation of consistent individual judgements over these three propositions is 
shown in table 1. 
                                                 
1 For the example discussed here we can take  as the material conditional. 
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Officer  P P Q  Q 
1  true true true 
2  true false false 
3  false true false 
Majority:  true true false 
Table 1: An example of the Discursive Dilemma.  
 
Officer 1 thinks that the suspect has bought fertilizer, that if the subject has bought 
fertilizer he is planning to build a bomb, and consequently thinks the suspect builds a 
bomb. Officer 2 also thinks that the suspect has bought fertilizer, but disagrees with the 
claim that buying fertilizer implies that the suspect builds a bomb, and thinks that the 
suspect does not build a bomb. Officer 3 disagrees with his two colleagues about whether 
the suspect has bought fertilizer. He believes that if the suspect had bought fertilizer he 
would be building a bomb. But since he has not, officer 3 can hold (for whatever reason, as 
no conclusion follows from the premises) that the suspect does not build a bomb.  
The problem in this situation is that the three officers will find it difficult to determine 
their joint stance as an investigative unit. A majority vote on each proposition yields the 
results as stated in bottom row of table 1. A majority thinks that the suspect has bought 
fertilizer, a majority thinks that if the suspect has bought fertilizer he is assembling a 
bomb, but a majority also thinks that the suspect is not building a bomb. Thus the majority 
judgements are contradictory. This contradiction instantiates one version of the discursive 
dilemma.  
Consider a second example to demonstrate that the discursive dilemma comes in 
different forms. Here a team of detectives has to decide whether to bring charges forward 
against a suspected murderer. The three detectives consider the following propositions:  
 The murder weapon is identified (P).  
 The suspect had a motive (Q). 
 The suspect should be charged (R).  
 Charges should be brought forward if and only if the weapon is identified and the 
suspect had a motive ( P Q R  ). 
We assume that the three detectives all agree on the last proposition, which one can 
interpret as a universally agreed doctrine. They disagree, however, on the other three 
propositions, as table 2 shows.  
 
 P Q P Q R   R 
Detective 1  true  true  true  true  
Detective 2  true  false  true  false  
Detective 3  false  true  true  false  
Majority  true  true  true  false  
Table 2: The discursive dilemma in conjunctive form.  
 
As in the first example, each individual position is consistent, but the majority position 
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is not. Holding P, Q, and P Q R   to be true, but R to be false, is a contradiction. The 
question is: how should the three detectives agree on a joint position?  
In these examples we can recognize some features of the discursive dilemma and 
problems of judgement aggregation more generally. First, the dilemmas described here are 
fairly realistic in the sense that there are many situations in which groups of people hold 
judgements over different logically connected propositions and have to form a joint 
position on these propositions. Second, the examples can easily be extended to groups with 
more than 3 agents. Third, the individual judgements the agents hold are not unusual or 
unreasonable. Fourth, the dilemma only arises for certain judgement profiles, but the 
possibility of their occurrence challenges us to find judgement aggregation procedures that 
can deal with these situations.  
How does the discursive dilemma pertain to distributed thinking? A thinking system 
understood in a minimal way is a system that takes inputs and produces outputs by 
processing these inputs. A distributed thinking system can be understood as a group of 
thinkers who coordinate their thinking activities. Since the thinking is distributed, one can 
expect every single thinker to do some thinking on their own. However, to function as a 
thinking system it is necessary to aggregate the information available to the single thinkers 
and produce a collective output. Judgement aggregation is a model of such a process: Each 
individual is a single thinker with stances on certain propositions. Since the single thinkers 
are part of a distributed thinking system, the system must aggregate their stances on the 
propositions and produce a collective stance. In the same way as we want single thinkers to 
be rational, we also require a system of distributed thinking to be rational. Judgement 
aggregation maps out the logical space of possible aggregation procedures and informs us 
of the options and constraints for distributed thinking.  
The notion of “thinking” in the analysis offered here is deliberately minimal. It 
presupposes only that thinkers assign truth values to each proposition and that thinkers 
correctly apply propositional logic. In addition, the distributed thinking system must be 
able follow an aggregation rule. The problems arising from this simplified notion of 
thinking are neither trivial nor simple, and it is worthwhile to start with simple examples 
before moving on to more complex analyses. This minimal notion of thinking deliberately 
omits many other aspects of human thinkers: People can have degrees of beliefs, not just 
dichotomous judgements. Thinking does not only involve beliefs, but also desires. A 
complete picture of human thinking would also incorporate intentions, emotions, and 
consciousness. Nonetheless, I argue that such a rich notion of thinking can be set aside for 
now. It can be set aside because even the minimal notion of thinking used in this paper 
raises interesting questions about the rationality and epistemic quality of distributed 
thinking systems.  
 2 Impossibility Results And Escape Routes 
I now describe the problem of judgement aggregation more generally and explain List and 
Pettit’s (2002) impossibility result. Each individual has a set of judgements on a given 
agenda. The agenda contains all propositions in question and their respective negations. 
For the impossibility result to arise, the agenda must be sufficiently complex, that is it must 
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contain at least two propositions P and Q and either P Q  , P Q , or P Q  (and their 
negations). An individual set of judgements must be complete (so that for all items on the 
agenda, it contains either the proposition or its negation), it must be consistent and 
deductively closed. If these three conditions are met, we call a judgement set fully rational. 
All the individual sets of judgements together form a judgement profile. For instance, 
tables 1 and 2 state specific judgement profiles.  
The aim of judgement aggregation is to proceed from judgement profiles to a collective 
judgement set. We assume that the collective judgement set must also be consistent, 
complete, and deductively closed (this is called the collective rationality condition, see e.g. 
List, forthcominga) and that the aggregation function never fails to produce output. An 
aggregation function has all possible judgement profiles as domain and all possible 
collective sets of judgements as co-domain, i. e. it maps judgement profiles onto collective 
sets of judgements. Put differently: an aggregation function takes a judgement profile as 
input and gives one fully rational collective set of judgements as output.  
List and Pettit describe three desiderata that an aggregation function should meet:  
Universal Domain.  
The aggregation function accepts as input all logically possible judgement profiles, as 
long as all individual judgement sets are consistent, complete, and deductively closed.  
Anonymity.  
The aggregation function is not responsive to permutations of judgement sets in the 
profile. This means that the outcome should not change if we shuffle the agents, but 
leave everything else unchanged.  
Systematicity.  
The result of the aggregation function for any proposition depends only on the 
judgements made on this proposition, and the pattern of dependence is the same for 
all propositions. 
Universal Domain is an immediately convincing desideratum: The aggregation function 
should be able to aggregate all logically possible profiles, as long as all individuals hold 
fully rational judgements. If the aggregation function did not have a universal domain it 
would fail to aggregate some judgement profiles that can occur, and there is no good 
reason to rule out any judgement profiles ex ante.  
Anonymity is also a rather convincing desideratum for many aggregation problems. The 
intuitive appeal behind anonymity is that it ensures the equal treatment of all judgement 
sets, no matter who holds them. For example, anonymity rules out that the aggregation 
function always follows the judgement set of one individual, that is it rules out 
‘aggregation’ by letting one agent be the dictator.  
The systematicity condition is more contested. Note that it contains the weaker 
independence condition (see. e.g. Dietrich, 2007):  
Independence.  
The result of the aggregation function for any proposition depends only on the 
judgements made on this proposition. 
The intuitive plausibility of independence is easy to argue for (even though it is also not 
uncontested). Independence ensures that the collective judgement on a proposition is 
influenced only by individual positions on that specific proposition. If we consider a 
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proposition P, changes in the profile regarding any other proposition should not influence 
the collective judgement on P.  
Systematicity is more demanding than independence because it also demands that the 
same pattern of individual judgements on any proposition should lead to the same 
collective judgement on these propositions. More precisely, for any two propositions P, Q: 
if all individuals have the same judgements on P and on Q , then the collective results for P 
and Q must not differ. The intuitive ideal behind this condition is to treat all propositions 
equally. Systematicity rules out, for instance, the requirement of different qualified 
majorities for different propositions.  
List and Pettit state and prove a theorem of judgement aggregation:  
Theorem (List and Pettit 2002):  
There exists no judgment aggregation function generating complete, consistent and 
deductively closed collective sets of judgments which satisfies unanimity, anonymity 
and systematicity. 
This impossibility result has kicked off the research into questions of judgement 
aggregation and has led to a flourishing, often technically advanced literature (see List and 
Puppe, 2009, for a survey). The theorem is important because it systematizes the special 
case of the discursive dilemma and shows that any form of judgement aggregation over a 
sufficiently complex agenda fails to meet all the described desiderata together. This poses a 
challenge for the aggregation of judgements: Either judgement aggregation fails (for some 
profiles), or one has to argue that at least one of the desiderata can and should be relaxed in 
order to avoid the impossibility result.2  
Returning to the examples of the discursive dilemma above, I will now discuss four 
procedures to arrive at collective judgements: the majority vote on each proposition, the 
premise- and the conclusion-based procedure, and a dictatorship. The majority vote was 
already mentioned in the introduction of the discursive dilemma. If the collective votes on 
all propositions with simple majority, the group may end up with an inconsistent 
judgement set. This is unsatisfactory, and several ways to avoid this result have been 
proposed. The majority vote on all propositions satisfies universal domain, anonymity and 
systematicity, but fails to produce fully rational judgement sets for all logically possible 
judgement profiles.  
The premise-based procedure divides the propositions on the agenda into two sets: the 
premises and the conclusion(s). A majority vote is taken on each premise, and the premises 
adapted by these votes determine the remaining propositions, i. e. the conclusions, by 
deductive closure. For the discursive dilemma stated in table 1, P and P Q  can be taken 
as premises, Q as the conclusion. The majority adopts both premises, and deduces that Q 
must also be true. It therefore reaches the collective judgement set  , ,P P Q Q .3 More 
                                                 
2 The literature on judgement aggregation has produced many refinements and extensions to List’s and 
Pettit’s 2002 result, which cannot be described in detail here. Most important is perhaps Pauly and van 
Hees’s (2006) generalizations, and further more general results in Dietrich and List (2007). The general 
structure of these additions is to discuss other, often weaker or differently constructed desiderata and 
prove impossibility (and sometimes possibility) results for aggregation functions. A very clear framework 
for judgement aggregation in general logic is provided by Dietrich (2007). 
3 It is not always the case that the propositions can be neatly divided into premises and conclusions. In 
addition, the premises do not necessarily determine the truth value(s) of the conclusion(s). For instance, if 
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loosely speaking, the premise based procedure means: vote on the premises, deduce the 
conclusion. The premise based procedure usually produces fully rational collective 
judgement sets4, but it violates systematicity because the collective judgement on the 
conclusion does not only depend on the individual judgements regarding the conclusion.  
In the MI5 example, the worry with the premise based procedure is that it overrules the 
majority vote. The second and perhaps more obvious procedure to the aggregation problem 
is to disregard the majority vote on the premises and only vote on the conclusion. This is 
the conclusion based procedure. For table 1 it leads the collective to adopt not-Q. Note that 
the collective does not take any view on the premises according to the conclusion-based 
view. Therefore, the conclusion-based procedure fails to produce complete collective 
judgement sets.  
Another procedure to avoid collective inconsistency is to nominate a dictator, that is a 
person whose individual judgement set fully determines the collective judgement set. For 
instance, one could stipulate that the group always adopts the judgements of individual 1. 
Since the individual judgement sets are complete, consistent, and deductively closed, the 
“collective” judgement set will be, too. A dictatorship is a blatant violation of the 
anonymity condition, because a reshuffling of individuals (in particular, changing the 
dictator) may change the outcome.  
Table 3 compares the four aggregation procedures. None of the procedures meets all the 
desiderata and the requirement of collective rationality (completeness, consistency, and 
deductive closure) together. List’s and Pettit’s theorem shows that there is in fact no 
aggregation procedure that can meet all these desiderata together. It is therefore necessary 
to engage in a normative debate as to which desiderata should be sacrificed, or at least 
relaxed, to find a working aggregation procedure.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
the votes on the premises had resulted in  ,P P Q  , the conclusion Q  would not be determined by 
deductive closure because both Q and Q  are consistent with the judgements on the premises. 
4 Except for those cases described in note 3. 
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Procedure  Universal Domain  Anonymity  Systematicity  Collective 
Rationality  
Majority rule  +  +  +  –  
Dictator  +  –  +  +  
Premise-based  +  +  –  +  
Conclusion-based  +  +  +*  –  
Table 3: Aggregation procedures in comparison (* systematicity holds for the 
conclusions).  
 
The desiderata under discussion are motivated by a broadly “democratic” set of values 
(see for instance List, 2006). Universal domain can be normatively attractive from a 
democratic perspective because a democratically governed group should not rule out 
rational individual judgements ex ante. Anonymity can be attractive because it ensures that 
every member of the group has the same level of influence over the collective result. 
Systematicity ensures an equal treatment of all propositions, so that the aggregation 
procedure does not have an ex ante bias to define some propositions as “special” or “more 
important”. List and Pettit (2002) discuss several options to relax one of the three 
desiderata, or one of the three rationality conditions completeness, consistency, and 
deductive closure. Relaxing collective consistency and deductive closure is unattractive, 
because it results in irrational collective judgement sets. Other options are more attractive, 
depending on the circumstances. Relaxing universal domain is plausible when the 
individuals tend to have judgement profiles that are “well-behaved”, that is do not give rise 
to the discursive dilemma. Relaxing anonymity may in particular be justified when the 
competence in the group is unevenly distributed (List, 2006). Relaxing systematicity is 
perhaps the most attractive move, because the idea that the collective judgements on 
different propositions do not influence each other appears implausible for a set of logically 
connected propositions in the first place. Even more implausible, systematicity also 
demands that all propositions are treated exactly equal in that regard. If a group deliberates 
on a number of dependent propositions, it should not be ruled out ex ante that the change 
of individual opinions on a proposition Φ can change the collective judgement on another 
proposition Ψ , even if the individual judgements on Ψ have not changed. Neither should it 
be ruled out that the same pattern of individual judgements for Φ and for Ψ can lead to 
different collective judgements on Φ and Ψ .  
When considering distributed thinking systems, the background set of values to decide 
on an aggregation procedure does not necessarily have to be “democratic”. But the 
properties one would like to see in a judgement aggregation function for distributed 
thinking may be similar. Universal domain is desirable from a distributed thinking 
perspective because the thinking process should not break down for certain inputs. 
Whether anonymity and systematicity are normatively desirable properties of a distributed 
thinking system is less clear. Anonymity is attractive if every thinking unit in the system of 
distributed thinking should be treated equally.5 In the same vein, systematicity may be 
                                                 
5 Also, relaxing anonymity does not yield particularly attractive aggregation procedures. In a very closely 
related setup, Pauly and van Hees (2006) show that the only aggregation procedure that meets all other 
desiderata is a dictatorship. 
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important when all propositions on the agenda should be treated equally.  
Even if we relax one or more of the desiderata, we still need to say how we relax these 
desiderata and which aggregation functions we want to use. One important criterion for an 
aggregation function is that it meets the “knowledge challenge”. This means that the 
aggregation function should be good at pooling the individual information that is 
distributed among individuals to reach correct outcomes. To explore the knowledge 
challenge in greater detail, I discuss the truth tracking performance of different aggregation 
functions.  
 3 An Epistemic Perspective 
When voting on the truth or falsity of a single proposition, the Condorcet Jury Theorem 
shows that large groups can be almost always correct, as long as each member of the group 
is just slightly better than random at identifying the correct choice. Assume there is one 
correct state of the world, which is either that Φ or not-Φ is correct (or the better 
alternative). The competence assumption of the Condorcet Jury Theorem states that all 
individuals have a competence greater than 0.5. The competence of an individual is the 
probability to choose the correct alternative. With a competence greater than 0.5 the 
individuals are better than random in making the correct judgement between two 
alternatives.  
The Condorcet Jury Theorem tells us: If all individuals have the same level of 
competence greater than 0.5, if their votes are independent6, and if they do not 
misrepresent their personal judgements for strategic reasons, then large groups will almost 
certainly choose the correct alternative in a majority vote.7 The pooling of the individual 
competence in the vote renders the group much more competent than each single 
individual.  
Let there be n ndividuals (with n being odd to avoid ties), and let the probability of all 
the different individuals 1 to n be p , with p > 0.5 . The probability of a group to choose the 
correct alternative is (Grofman, Owen and Feld, 1983):  
 
( 1)/2
( , ) (1 ) .
n
CJT h n h
h n
n
P n p p p
h

 
 
 

 

   (1) 
Table 4 shows the group competence for some levels of individual competence and 
different group sizes. One can see that even for relatively small levels of competence like 
0.55, large groups reach a group competence of almost 100%. Therefore, if the conditions 
of the Condorcet Jury Theorem hold, groups can be excellent “truth trackers” in 
dichotomous choice situations.  
 
                                                 
6 More precisely, if the votes are probabilistically independent, conditional on the truth value of Φ. 
7 The joint assumption of competence and independence rarely holds in practice. Weaker versions of the 
theorem have been proved. Dietrich (2008) points out that it is not possible to (statistically) justify both 
the independence and the competence assumptions and discusses less demanding assumptions and their 
implications. 
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n | p  0.501  0.51  0.55  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  
11  0.503  0.527  0.633  0.753  0.922  0.988  1  
101  0.508  0.580  0.844  0.979  1  1  1  
1001  0.525  0.737  0.999  1  1  1  1  
Table 4: Group competence according to formula 1.  
 
The graph in figure 1 shows how the group competence develops for different group 
sizes and different values of p. One can see how larger groups quickly approach high 
competence if p >0 .5, but approach a group competence of 0 for p < 0.5 . 
 
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
 
The Condorcet Jury Theorem is the starting point to analyse richer collective decision 
problems. For the problems of judgement aggregation discussed above, each single 
proposition is a dichotomous choice problem, but the judgement aggregation problem as a 
whole is more complex. We have seen that there are different aggregation procedures, each 
with advantages and drawbacks. One possible normative criterion to decide for one 
aggregation procedure is to consider its epistemic performance, that is its ability to “track 
the truth”. Here I focus primarily on a comparison between the conclusion and the premise 
based procedure, in line with discussions in Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) and List 
(2006).  
If a group follows the conclusion based procedure, it simply votes on the conclusion, 
and disregards the premises. If the group follows the premise based procedure, it votes on 
the premises and derives the conclusion by deductive closure. This will lead to different 
epistemic performances. I will show the diverging epistemic performances by discussing 
the detective example as stated in table 2 above. The three proposition P , Q, R and their 
respective negations are on the agenda. In addition, all individuals accept ( )P Q R   as 
true8, and we assume it is true as a matter of fact. Therefore, the world can be in 4 different 
states: 
                                                 
8 Assuming that the normative proposition R refers to a fact. 
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S1 P Q R 
S2 P  Q R  
S3 P Q  R  
S4 P  Q  R  
 
  
Less technically, all propositions can be true, or one of the premises and the conclusion 
are false, or both premises and the conclusion are false. These are also the only logically 
possible complete, consistent and deductively closed judgement sets, since we accept 
( )P Q R   as a background assumption.  
For now, let us assume that a decision is epistemically correct if and only if it produces 
the correct stance on conclusion R (we discuss the idea that the stances on the premises 
should also be true below). In a premise based procedure one votes only on the premises 
and deduces the conclusion. Therefore, the correct conclusion can be reached with 
different collective judgements on the premises: 
 
State Conclusion Premise judgements with correct conclusion 
S1 R  ,P Q  
S2 R       , , , , ,P Q P Q P Q     
S3 R       , , , , ,P Q P Q P Q     
S4 R       , , , , ,P Q P Q P Q     
  
The point to note here is that the premise based procedure can lead to the right 
conclusion even if one or both collective judgements on the premises are wrong. One can 
therefore be right for the wrong reasons. For instance, an agent can have the judgements P 
and ¬Q  and therefore ¬R, even though the world is in state where ¬P and Q are true. The 
agent is right to hold ¬R, but for the wrong reasons. If one wants the group to be right for 
“the right reasons” (Bovens and Rabinowicz, 2006, p. 138f.), one should only consider 
cases where the collective judgements on both premises are correct, not only the 
conclusion derived from them.  
I now turn to the conclusion based procedure. There are two distinct ways for 
individuals to deal with a conclusion based system. Either each single individual takes their 
judgements on the premises and derives the conclusion. This is the way Bovens and 
Rabinowicz propose. The conclusion based procedure leads to a correct judgement on the 
 - 13 - 
conclusion if and only if a majority of individuals has the correct assessment of the 
conclusion. However, they may well have come to that assessment for the wrong reasons. 
For instance, if the correct assessment of the conclusion is that R is false, one can arrive at 
that conclusion from three different judgement sets on the two premises: 
     , , , , ,P Q P Q P Q     . Only one set of judgement can be the right one, but all lead 
to the correct judgement on the conclusion. Alternatively, the agents completely disregard 
their judgements on the premises and make judgements only on the conclusion. In this 
case, the decision problem is collapsed into a decision on a single proposition, and the 
standard Condorcet Jury Theorem formula (1) applies. This way is unattractive from an 
epistemic standpoint because it completely disregards the information the individuals have 
on the premises. 
Bovens and Rabinowicz calculate the probabilities for the group to make the right 
judgement on the conclusion, They consider four cases:  
 
1. The use of the premise based procedure where all correct conclusions are counted.  
2. The use of the premise based procedure where only judgements based on the right 
reasons are counted as correct.  
3. The use of the conclusion based procedure where all correct conclusions are counted.  
4. The use of the conclusion based procedure where conclusions are counted as correct 
if a majority of individuals has reached the correct judgement on the conclusion for 
the right reason. 
These calculations depend on parameters. In addition to the individual competence p and 
the group size n, it also matters how likely the different states S1 to S4 are, which is 
determined by the prior probabilities of P , Q, and R . Let ( )P  be the prior probability 
that P is true; ( )Q  be the prior probability that Q is true. This in turn determines 
( ) ( ) ( )R P Q   .  
Figure 2 shows the results for the group competence, dependent on the individual 
competence p, for n = 101 , ( ) ( ) 0.5P Q    and ( ) 0.25R  . The two solid curves are 
the results for the premise based procedure, the two dashed curves for the conclusion based 
procedure. pbp is the result for the premise based procedure, pbp-rr for the premise based 
procedure when only results with the right reasons are counted as correct. Similarly, cbp 
shows the result for the conclusion based procedure, cbp-rr the conclusion based procedure 
with the correctness for the rights reason criterion. 
 
 *** Figure 2 about here *** 
 
 
First, consider the results for 0.5p  , that is the results with the (usually) more 
plausible assumption that individuals tend to be at least as good as a coin toss in making 
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their decisions. For the premise based procedure, the group competence is 0.5 for p = 0.5, 
and then quickly approaches 1 for larger p . If being right for the right reason matters, the 
group competence starts from a lower level, but still approaches 1 quickly. The conclusion 
based procedure starts from a higher level (0.75), but is quickly outperformed by the 
premise based procedure at a competence level of around 0.55. Interestingly, which 
procedure performs better depends on the level of p. Unsurprisingly, the procedures that 
care for being right for the right reasons have lower levels of collective competence. The 
premise based procedure for the right reasons performs better than the conclusion based 
procedure for the right reasons.  
Now consider the results for competence levels lower than 0.5. First, there is a range of 
p for which the conclusion-based procedure fares better than the premise based procedure. 
Second, the reliability of the premise based procedure dips for values that are close but 
below 0.5 for p.9 Third, if individuals are incompetent, they are very unlikely to be right 
for the right reasons. Overall, results for competence levels of p < 0.5 are of less interest 
because it is implausible that individuals are systematically worse than a toin coss.  
Figure 3 shows the results for the same group size, but with different prior probabilities, 
namely ( ) ( ) 0.8P Q    and consequently ( ) 0.64R  . For these parameter values, the 
premise based procedure does better for all values p > 0.5. One can see that the 
performance of the two procedures depends on the prior probabilities. Both procedures 
perform worse around p = 0.5 compared to figure 2, but the conclusion based procedure is 
still stronger in an area below 0.5. 
 
 
 
 *** Figure 3 about here *** 
 
 
List (2006, n. 25) criticizes the approach taken by Bovens and Rabinowicz because they 
do not distinguish between positive and negative reliability.10 Positive reliability is the 
probability that the group correctly identifies R as true, negative reliability the probability 
that the group correctly identifies R as false. Different decision problems require different 
attention to the two reliabilities. Bovens and Rabinowicz simply calculate the probability 
that the group is correct. This may be misleading. Intuitively, this can be seen in figure 2 
by considering the performances of the different aggregation procedures with p = 0.5, i. e. 
                                                 
9 This feature of the premise based procedure has been overlooked by Bovens and Rabinowicz (see figure 
6, where this dip is missing). The reason for this dip is quite easy to grasp intuitively: For very low p, the 
premise based procedure is reliably wrong on both premises. If the world is in state S1 or S4, it will 
produce the wrong judgement on R, but if the world is in S2 or S3, it will produce the right outcome 
(though for the wrong reason, swapping the true and the false premise). As p approaches the watershed of 
0.5, the procedure is less reliable false. It is still very unlikely that it is correct about both premises, but it 
is occasionally correct on one of them. Being sometimes right on one conclusion produces better results if 
the world is in S4, but worse results if the world is in either S2 or S3 (and it does not matter for S1). Since 
the world is more often in either S2 or S3 than in S4, the performance of the premise based procedure 
dips for p close to but lower than 0.5.  
10 List also operates with asymmetrical individual competence, that is individuals have different competence 
for correctly judging true and false propositions. 
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when the individual competence is no better than a coin toss. An unbiased procedure 
should then be able to pick out the right result in half of the cases. But the conclusion 
based procedure is doing much better. This is because the conclusion based procedure has 
a bias towards assuming that R is false. Since figure 2 is drawn for ( ) 0.25R  , this bias 
plays to the advantage of the conclusion based formula. This result is due to a high 
negative reliability and the fact that for the given prior probabilities the conclusion is more 
often false than true. However, this comes at the cost of a low positive reliability. Figure 3 
shows that the premise based procedure is also biased for other parameter setting. Here 
both procedures show a bias that is to their disadvantage. 
The upshot of the epistemic analysis is that different procedures for aggregating 
judgements have different qualities to “track the truth”. These considerations show that a 
formal analysis of Goldman’s “knowledge challenge” can help to decide which 
aggregation rule to use. For the example analysed here, the premise based procedure 
performs well in most situations where individuals are competent. With regard to 
distributed thinking more generally, it is worthwhile exploring with formal models how 
different systems of distributed thinking lead to different epistemic success. 
 4 Distributed and Consistent Thinking 
Distributed thinking can proceed in different ways. One way to conceptualize a distributed 
thinking system is to imagine a system where distributed non-thinking parts are connected 
in such a way that the whole assembly is a thinking system. A computer may be a 
distributed thinking system in that weak sense. Each single transistor could be seen as a 
non-thinking part, while the computer arranges these non-thinking parts in such a way that 
it can think, where thinking is taken as being able to solve logical problems. This notion of 
a thinking system is too weak because any thinking system is distributed in that sense. 
Brains, for instance, could be seen a distributed thinking system made of neurons.  
The definition becomes more interesting if we assume that a distributed thinking system 
consists of several thinking sub-units. This definition is better because it rules out single 
computers and (perhaps) single brains, but includes relevant cases like groups of several 
agents, networked systems, et cetera. The interesting aspect of a distributed thinking 
system defined like that is the potential tension between the individual and the collective 
thinking. Oftentimes this tension is productive. We talk (rather vaguely) of “swarm 
intelligence” or “collective intelligence”, and we sometimes experience how group 
deliberation can lead to better, more informed results than decisions by single individuals. 
But this tension can also lead to breakdowns of “collective intelligence”, when no 
agreement can be reached, when the outcomes are inconsistent, or just plain wrong. 
I have argued that judgement aggregation provides a useful framework for the analysis 
of distributed thinking. However, two anonymous referees argued that the judgement 
aggregation framework does not connect with the concept of distributed thinking for at 
least three reasons. First, judgement aggregation is not dynamic, in contrast to cognitive 
distribution, which emphasizes the dynamic interaction between the thinking units. 
Second, judgement aggregation does not engage with a central feature of the distributed 
cognition framework: the fact that minds and world interact, and that organisms reshape 
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their environment in order to solve cognitive problems. This claim is often referred to by 
claiming that cognition happens “in the wild”. Third, the judgement aggregation 
framework allegedly attempts to reduce distributed thinking to the thinking of sub-units, 
and does not appreciate that distributed thinking arises because higher level structures 
emerge.  
My response is as follows. I largely concur with the first claim regarding the discursive 
dilemma, but point out that research in judgement aggregation raises interesting question 
about the possible dynamics that avoid the described impossibility results. This answer is 
connected with the second claim. While judgement aggregation per se does not address the 
interaction between minds and environment, it does raise questions as to how agents 
restructure their decision environment in order to avoid paradoxes like the discursive 
dilemma. Finally, I maintain that the validity of the third claim depends on the notion of 
emergence employed. In a weak sense, judgement aggregation and social choice theory 
support the claim that distributed thinking systems have emergent properties. I will now 
address each objection in greater detail.  
Judgement aggregation, at least in the simple versions discussed here, does not 
incorporate a dynamic change of judgements through an interaction of individual and 
group judgements.11 But the question of dynamics is raised indirectly by the impossibility 
results mentioned above, since the impossibility results pose the question how the 
breakdown of the aggregation process is avoided in practice. The discursive dilemma, for 
example, only arises for some of the many possible judgement profiles. It is therefore 
conceivable that a dynamic process, especially a process of deliberation, reduces or 
eradicates those profiles that lead to impossibility results. It is well known that the Arrow 
paradox can be avoided if the preference profile has certain structural properties, thereby 
relaxing the universal domain axiom (Dryzek and List, 2003; Black, 1948). Similar results 
hold for judgement aggregation. In case of the discursive dilemma, a suitable restriction of 
the universal domain axiom avoids the impossibility result (List and Pettit, 2002). 
Empirical observations support the claim that deliberation leads to fewer occurences of the 
discursive dilemma (List et al., 2006).12 Thus, a dynamic process like deliberation may 
mitigate the occurence of the impossibility result, and the framework of judgement 
aggregation raises interesting questions about the nature of the dynamic processes to avoid 
a breakdown of collective rationality. I therefore claim that even a static analysis in terms 
of judgement aggregation provides the debate on distributed thinking with useful concepts 
to analyse the dynamic processes. 
The charge that judgement aggregation fails to scrutinize cognition “in the wild” can 
also be addressed by considering the escape routes to avoid impossibility results. Hutchins 
(1995) discusses several ways of how groups can structure their own decision making to 
simplify it, among them hierarchy and consensus (p. 256–259). Clark also emphasizes the 
importance of “broader social and institutional contexts of action” (p. 186). List and Pettit 
show that if the individuals agree on a unidimensional alignment of the problem (similar to 
                                                 
11 However, research on how the judgement aggregation framework pertains to the change of judgements is 
undertaken. See List, forthcomingb. 
12 In addition,Bonnefon (2007) reports that individuals change their preference for the conclusion and 
premise based procedure changes with the nature of the decision. 
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a left-right dimension in party politics), the dilemma can be avoided, even though 
individuals can disagree on their judgements. In addition, the dilemma disappears when the 
decision is delegated to specialists for each proposition (a form of “local dictatorship”), or 
when deliberation leads to a convergence of judgements. Thus, even though judgement 
aggregation does not directly explore decision group thinking “in the wild”, the discussion 
of escape routes is very much concerned with the the dynamic interaction of individuals 
and their potential to restructure the decision problem.  
Finally, I turn to the charge that judgement aggregation is reductionist and fails to do 
justice to the emergent properties of distributed thinking systems. This charge hinges on 
the notion of emergence and reduction used. It is true that judgement aggregation is 
interested in aggregating individual to collective judgements. But the central result of the 
judgement aggregation research programme is that the aggregation is non-trivial, and that 
the group judgements cannot just be derived by summing up and counting the individual 
judgements. To underline this point, I use William Wimsatt’s work on emergence and 
reduction. Wimsatt (1997) proposes a weak working definition for emergence: a system 
has emergent properties if it fails to be aggregative. For Wimsatt, the ideal aggregative 
system is invariant with regard to changes of like-for-like components, it scales linearly in 
size, the system properties are invariant with regard to a decomposition or reaggregation of 
the system, and there is no positive or negative interaction among the parts of the system. 
For instance, a heap of sugar is aggregative with regard to its mass. I can exchange one 
gramm of sugar for another gramm and its mass remains the same. If I add 1 gramm of 
sugar, the total mass increases by 1 gramm. If I divide the heap of sugar in two piles, the 
two piles each have half the mass of the original heap. If I put the heaps together again, I 
obtain the same mass. Finally, if I had two different types of sugar (brown and white sugar, 
say), this would not lead to positive or negative interactions in terms of the mass of the two 
types. Most systems are not entirely aggregative. For Wimsatt, the less aggregative a 
system is with regard to its properties, the more emergent properties it has.  
Since the results presented above show that judgements on logically connected 
propositions cannot always be aggregated, given the stated axioms, such a system has 
emergent properties in Wimsatt’s weak sense. One central result of the judgement 
aggregation research programme is that the sentence “A collective judgement of a group 
on a set of logically connected propositions is nothing but the aggregation of individual 
judgements” is not trivially true, since the aggregation encounters impossibility results. 
The results from judgement aggregation thus casts doubt on a simple “nothing but” 
reduction of group judgements, and weak emergence in Wimsatt’s sense is embraced. For 
Wimsatt, “[a]n emergent property is—roughly—a system property which is dependent on 
the mode of the organization of the system’s parts” (1997, p. S373, italics omitted). In this 
sense, the process of judgement aggregation has at least weak emergent properties. 
Whether this weak notion of emergence is enough to be of interest for the distributed 
cognition framework is a further question I leave to others. But I agree with Poirier and 
Chicoisne (2008) that the borders of distributed cognition are fuzzy.  
Judgement aggregation as a field (in the simple treatments as discussed above) shows 
that even very simple reasoning processes run into difficulties when trying to turn rational 
individual judgements on logically connected propositions to rational collective 
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judgements. If these problems arise even for the fairly simple problems like the discursive 
dilemma, one can anticipate similar and more difficult problems once one moves to more 
complicated settings. The basic lesson from the discursive dilemma is that the decision on 
the best processes applied in distributed thinking involves trade-offs between different 
properties of the reasoning process. Some processes are clearly worse than others, but 
when it comes to the best processes, different considerations need to be weighed against 
each other.  
One possible consideration is the epistemic success of the procedures, i. e. the ability of 
the distributed thinking system to “track the truth”. It is interesting to note that, for 
instance, in the comparison of the premise and the conclusion based procedure, it depends 
on the context of the decision problem which procedure performs best. However, if we 
introduce the additional requirement that the procedure must reach the correct decision for 
the right reasons, then the premise based procedure is the clear winner in the example 
discussed. Being right for the right reasons can also be important if the group has to justify 
its decisions, or if the reasoning the group applies will be adopted or imitated in future 
reasoning processes.  
Many extensions of the simple examples discussed in this paper are possible. One 
should explore more complex decision problems, different logical dependencies, cases 
with incomplete judgement sets, the heterogeneous competence levels, or settings where 
certain types of judgement errors are worse than others. Most of these questions have 
already been addressed in the literature on judgement aggregation and information pooling. 
The emerging literature on distributed thinking can benefit from the analytical and 
normative debates in these areas.  
 
 Appendix 
Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) calculate the probabilities of the group being correct, 
conditional on the state. They define pbpM  as the proposition ‘The premise based 
procedure yields the correct result’ and calculate probabilities conditional on all 4 states:  
2
2 2
2
( | S1) ( , ) ,
( | S2) ( , ) ( , )(1 ( , )) (1 ( , )) ,
( | S3) ( | S2),
( | S4) ( , ) 2 ( , )(1 ( , )).
pbp CJT
pbp CJT CJT CJT CJT
pbp pbp
pbp CJT CJT CJT
P M P n p
P M Pr n p P n p P n p P n p
P M P M
P M P n p P n p P n p

    

  
 (2) 
  
 
Note that one can arrive at the correct result even though some or even both collective 
judgements on the premises are wrong. Given the logical dependency between the 
propositions, we know that ( ) ( ) ( )R P Q   . Summing up the conditional probabilities 
of being correct with the premise based procedure, weighted by the probabilities that the 
different states obtain yields:  
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( ) ( | S1) ( ) ( ) ( | S2)(1 ( )) ( )
( | S3) ( )(1 ( )) ( | S4)(1 ( ))(1 ( )).
pbp pbp pbp
pbp pbp
P M P M P Q P M P Q
P M P Q P M P Q
   
   
  
    
 (3) 
 
Following Bovens and Rabinowicz’s exposition for the conclusion based procedure, let 
V be the proposition that a single voter determines the conclusion correctly, and P(V) the 
probability the voter does so. Since each single voter applies deductive closure, we obtain 
the following probabilities for each single voter to be correct on the conclusion, based on 
their competence p:  
 
 
2
2 2
2
( | S1)
( | S2) ( | 3) (1 ) (1 )
( | S4) 2 (1 ).
P V p
P V P V S p p p p
P V p p p

     
  
 (4) 
 
Each individual can reach the correct conclusion by being correct on both premises 
(probability 2p ) but one can also be correct, even if one is wrong on one or even both of 
the premises. Let cbpM  denote the proposition that the conclusion based procedure yields 
the correct result. Conditional on the state, we can apply equation 1 to calculate the 
probability of a correct majority vote on the conclusion:  
 
( | S ) ( , ( | S )).cbp CJTP M i P n P V i  (5) 
 
Summing up the probabilities weighted by the prior probabilities of the different states 
yields:  
 
 
( ) ( | 1) ( ) ( ) ( | 2)(1 ( )) ( )
( | 3) ( )(1 ( )) ( | 4)(1 ( ))(1 ( )).
cbp cbp cbp
cbp cbp
P M P M S P Q P M S P Q
P M S P Q P M S P Q
   
   
  
    
 (6) 
 
The results for the premise based procedure in (6) and the conclusion based procedure 
in (11) are based on the assumption that it does not matter whether the correct result is 
deduced from correct or incorrect judgements on the premises. If we want to be right “for 
the right reasons”, the cases where incorrect judgements lead to correct outcomes need to 
be removed. Let pbp rrM   denote the proposition that the group has arrived at the right 
judgement for the right reasons. This yields:  
 2( ) ( , )pbp rr CJTP M P n p   (7) 
 
Similarly, for the conclusion based procedure one want to consider the probability that a 
majority of voters is correct for the right reasons:  
 2( ) ( , ).cbp rr CJTP M P n p   
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Figures [also delivered in high quality encapsulated postcript format for production] 
 
 
Figure 1: Group competence ( , )CJTP n p  as a function of group size n, for different levels 
of individual competence p. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Results for the premise (pbp) and conclusion based procedure (cbp) with n = 101, 
( ) ( ) 0.5P Q   . rr signifies the results is for the “rights reasons” constraint. The x-axis 
shows individual, the y-axis collective competence. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Results for the premise (pbp) and conclusion based procedure (cbp) with n = 101, 
( ) ( ) 0.8P Q   . rr signifies the results is for the “rights reasons” constraint. The x-axis 
shows individual, the y-axis collective competence. 
